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1. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.[hereinafter CHRA]
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11[hereinafter "Charter"].
3. See McAllister-Windsor infra note 36 and accompanying text.
4. See Popaleni infra note 41 and accompanying text. 5. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1.
6. See Wignall infra note 58 and accompanying text.
7. See Stevenson infra note 65 and accompanying text.
8. See Irvine infra note 71 and accompanying text.
9. See Eyerley infra note 88 and accompanying text.
10. See Crouse infra note 78 and accompanying text.
11. See Kavanagh infra note 80 and accompanying text.
12. See Morris infra note 116 and accompanying text.
13. See Zündel infra note 118 and accompanying text.
14. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
15. See GNWT No. 9 infra note 148 and accompanying text.
16. See McAvinn No. 3 infra note 155 and accompanying text.
17. See Sawyer No. 2 infra note 141 and accompanying text.
18. See Vaid No. 1 infra note 158 and accompanying text.
19. Infra note 165 and accompanying text.
20. See Ermineskin infra note 173 and accompanying text.
21. See Bradley-Sharpe infra note 181 and accompanying text.
22. See Bell 2000 infra note 226 and accompanying text.
23. See Bell Decision infra note 227 and accompanying text.
24. See Zündel(FCA) infra note 260 and accompanying text.
25. See House of Commons infra note 250 and accompanying text.
26. See Airlines infra note 267 and accompanying text.
27. See Bauman infra note 283 and accompanying text.
28. See TWU infra note 299 and accompanying text. 29. See GRVD infra note 312 and accompanying text.
30. Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23.
31. See Lesiuk infra note 292 and accompanying text.
32. Canadian Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10.
33. R. v. Latimer (18 January 2001), 2001 SCC 1, No. 26980 (S.C.C.).
34.Unemployment Insurance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-I.
35. See Employment Insurance Act, supra note 30.
36. McAllister-Windsor v. Human Resources Development Canada (9 March 2001) T.D. 2/01 (C.H.R.T.)[hereinafter McAllister-Windsor].
36.1 Although not directly related to the facts of the complaint, the Tribunal pointed out that the maximum benefit for parental responsibilities was raised (as of December 31, 2000) to 35 weeks; and the cumulative maximum was correspondingly adjusted upwards to 50 weeks. Ibid. at para. 15.
37. Ibid. at para. 52.
38. Ibid. at para. 68.
39. Ibid. at para. 67.
40. Ibid. at para. 69.
41. Popaleni and Janssen v. Human Resources Development Canada (9 March 2001),
42. Ibid. at para. 48.
43. Solbach v. Canada (A.G.) (1999), 252 N.R. 137 (F.C.A.).
44. Supra note 41 at para. 52.
45. McAvinn and CHRC v. Strait Crossing Bridge Limited (15 November 2001), No. T.D. 13/01(C.H.R.T.).[hereinafter McAvinn].
46. Ibid. at para. 172.
47. Ibid. at para. 128.
48. Ibid. at para. 169.
49. Goyette c. Syndicat des employé(es) de terminus de Voyageur Colonial Limitée (CSN) (16 November 2001), No. T.D. 14/01 (C.H.R.T.).
50. Goyette and Tourville v. Voyageur Colonial Ltée (1997), 30 C.H.R.R. D/175(C.H.R.T.).
51. The Tribunal's written decision contained the following proviso: "il y a un problème pour effectuer les calculs et que les parties ne peuvent s'entendre au sujet des modalités pour déterminer les montants, le Tribunal pourra se réunir à la demande de l'une ou l'autre des parties pour entendre la preuve à cet effet et résoudre le différent [sic]." Ibid. at para. 4.
52. The Tribunal's reasoning was as follows: "Même si cette question est devenue une préoccupation de la plaignante, suite à des faits nouveaux survenus après la décision, soit la faillite du syndicat affilié, le Syndicat des employé-e-s de terminus Voyageur Colonial Limitée (CSN), le Tribunal ne peut prolonger et étendre sa juridiction indéfiniment. Dans ce dossier, les règles de justice naturelle ont été respectées et le Tribunal ne peut tenir des audiences en vue de déterminer la nature juridique de la personne liée indirectement à la plainte puisqu'il a déjà exercé sa juridiction." Supra note 49 at para. 45.
53. Daniels v. Myron (16 July 2001), T.D. 8/01 (C.H.R.T.) The Respondent had acknowledged in writing receipt of a letter sent April 10, 2001 regarding hearing dates and a Notice of Hearing dated April 24, 2001. He also acknowledged by telephone receipt of correspondence that established the hearing date as May 28 of the same year.
54. Ibid. at para. 30. The judicial decision referred to was Janzen v. Platy Entreprises, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
55. Supra note 53 at para. 31.
56. Ibid.
57. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1.
58. Wignall v. Department of National Revenue (Taxation) and the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (Interested Party) (8 June 2001), T.D. 5/01 (C.H.R.T.).[hereinafter Wignall].
59. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
60. Supra note 58 at para. 32.
61. Ibid. at para. 46.
62. Ibid. at para. 47.
63. Ibid. at para. 48.
64. Ibid. at para. 51.
65. Stevenson and CHRC v. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (5 December 2001), No. T.D. 16/01(C.H.R.T.).[hereinafter Stevenson].
66. Ibid. at para. 60.
67. The Tribunal declared: " The question at this point should have been whether Mr. Stevenson should be granted a further six months of medical leave from December 10, 1997, in order to return to full employment with the Service. Instead, Ms. Dodd and Mr. Outhwaite came to the conclusion on January 7, 1998 that Mr. Stevenson was totally unfit to return to his normal employment and occupy a position in headquarters, and that therefore, he should be medically discharged. There appears to be a bias, given the way the health evaluation was conducted and subsequently interpreted, against Mr. Stevenson because he is mentally ill. The prognosis for full recovery within a reasonable period of time is ignored." Ibid. at para. 63-64.
68. Ibid. at para. 70.
69. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3.[hereinafter Meiorin].
70. Ibid. at para. 82.
71. Irvine and CHRC v. Canadian Armed Forces( 23 November 2001), No. T.D. 15/01(C.H.R.T.)[hereinafter Irvine].
72. Ibid. at para. 13.
73. Ibid. at para. 41.
74. Ibid. at para. 141.
75. Ibid.
77. Ibid. at para. 162.
78. Crouse v. Canadian Steamship Lines Inc. (18 June 2001), T.D. 7/01(C.H.R.T.) [hereinafter Crouse].
79. In support of these conclusions, the Tribunal cited: Niles v. Canadian National Railway Company (1992) 18 C.H.R.R. D/152(C.H.R.T.) and Québec (C.D.P.D.J.) v. Montreal (City) [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665.
80. Kavanagh v. Attorney General of Canada (31 August 2001), T.D. 11/01 (C.H.R.T.). [hereinafter Kavanagh].
81. Ibid. at para. 35.
82. Ibid. at para. 141.
83. Ibid. at para. 166.
84. Ibid.
85.Ibid. at para. 178.
86. Ibid. at para. 187.
87. Ibid. at para. 181.
88. Eyerley v. Seaspan International Limited (21 December 2001), T.D. 18/01(C.H.R.T.)[hereinafter Eyerley].
89. Ibid. at para. 136. The arbitral decision referred to is Re: Air B.C. Ltd. and C.A.L.D.A. (1995), 50 L.A.C. (4th) 93.
90. Ibid. at para. 143, citing the Supreme Court decisions in Meiorin , supra note 69, and British Columbia (Superintendant of Motor vehicles) v. British Columbia(Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 [hereinafter Grismer].
91.Chopra v. Department of National Health and Welfare (13 August 2001), T.D. 10/01 (C.H.R.T)
92. Chopra v. Department of National Health and Welfare, [1996] C.H.R.D. No. 3 (C.H.R.T.)
93.See Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Department of National Health and Welfare (1998) 146 F.T.R. 106 (F.C.T.D.); see also (1999) 235 N.R. 195 (F.C.A.).
94. Rebuttal evidence that the Commission wished to introduce following the respondent's case was, in large measure, refused by the Tribunal. It took the view that principles of fairness to the respondent required a complainant to present its relevant evidence during the initial presentation of its case. In the matter before it, the Tribunal determined that three of the four witnesses proposed by the Commission intended to give evidence that the respondent could not reasonably have anticipated at the close of its case. See tribunal decision, supra note 91 at para. 12-15.
95. For the Tribunal's discussion of this question see paragraphs 16-30 of its decision, supra note 91.
96.In this regard, the Tribunal also adopted the findings of fact of the original tribunal: "I see no reason to disagree with the Soberman Tribunal's findings that the Complainant possessed little line management experience for the senior management position he was seeking. I also agree that the Department's prerequisite of management experience for the indeterminate position of Director of a Bureau was a reasonable justification to screen him out." Ibid. at para. 257.
97. Ibid. at para. 259.
98.Regarding the appointment on an acting basis of an unqualified candidate, the Tribunal said: " What is striking about this appointment is that Dr. Franklin was not qualified for the position. Any mistaken belief on the part of the Respondent that she was qualified would have been put to rest on July 9, 1991, when the PSCAB ruled that she did not meet the knowledge qualification for the position" nor the bilingual requirement. Although she had been found unqualified, the Respondent continued to employ her in the position, even after the PSC directive was issued ordering that she cease working on September 20, 1991. Over this entire period, of course, Dr Chopra continued to express his objection to her ongoing employment in the position, yet at no time did the Respondent see fit to appoint him or assign him to perform these duties on an acting basis." Ibid. at para. 264-65.
99. Ibid. at para. 266.
100. Ibid. at para. 276.
101. The decision varied the findings of the original tribunal. " On this point, the Tribunal said: In coming to the conclusion that the Respondent is liable, I realize that I may be a variance with some of the findings of the Soberman Tribunal. However, I believe that my decision has been made in accordance with my authority to substitute my view where I find that there was a palpable or manifest error in the first Tribunal's assessment of the facts. In addition, much of the relevant evidence on these issues was received by me during the second set of hearings, including the expert evidence of Dr. Weiner and the testimony of Dr. Liston. I must necessarily assess this new evidence in light of the overall evidence including that of the first Tribunal." Ibid. at para. 284.
102. Ibid. at para. 211.
103. Ibid. at para. 229. For a more complete review of these evidentiary issues see para. 213-237 of the decision.
104. National Capital Alliance on Race Relations (NCARR) v. Canada (Health and Welfare) (1997), 28 C.H.R.R. D/179 (C.H.R.T.).[hereinafter NCARR].
105.Nkwazi v. Correctional Service Canada (5 February 2001), T.D. 1/01 (C.H.R.T.).
106. In referring to the testimony of management, the Tribunal observed: " Mr. Bracknell says that there were problems with Ms. Nkwazi's charting. It would presumably have been a very simple matter for Mr. Bracknell to produce specific patient charts in order to illustrate the nature of his concerns in this regard. No charts were produced, however, and Mr. Bracknell was unable to identify a single instance where Ms. Nkwazi's charting was less than adequate...I reject this allegation in its entirety. Similarly, no details were provided with respect to the patient complaints that Mr. Bracknell says that he received, beyond the amorphous allegation that there were problems with Ms. Nkwazi's interaction. When challenged, Mr. Bracknell was unable to provide the name of a single patient who complained to him about Ms. Nkwazi. Ms. Thompson's allegations with respect to Ms. Nkwazi's purported difficulties interacting with patients were equally lacking in specificity." Ibid. at para. 215-216.
107. Regarding this issue, the Tribunal ordered that Correctional Service Canada provide the complainant with a letter of reference that truly reflected her performance as a nurse and to respond to verbal inquiries in a manner consistent with the letter of reference.
108. The Tribunal canvassed the law as it applied to the legal presumption against retrospective effect, pointing out that the provisions in question were not exclusively procedural in nature but created new liabilities. Since using them in the case before it would mean attaching prejudicial consequences to prior acts, it felt that the presumption should apply. For a more complete discussion of this issue see paragraphs 257-269 of the Tribunal decision.
109.Wong v. Royal Bank of Canada (15 June 2001), T.D. 06/01(C.H.R.T.). Another decision of the Tribunal rejecting a complaint that turned exclusively on the credibility of witnesses is: D'Arc Vollant v. Sante Canada et Reine Parenteau et Noella Bouchard (6 April 2001), D.T. 4/01 (C.H.R.T.).
110. Baptiste and CHRC v. Correctional Service Canada( 6 November 2001), T.D. 12/01(C.H.R.T.).
111. Ibid. at para. 18.
112. Ibid. at para. 19.
113. Ibid. at para. 85
114. Ibid. at para. 100.
115. Cizungu and CHRC c. Dééveloppement des ressources humaines Canada (31 July 2001), D.T.. 9/01(C.H.R.T.).
116. Morris v. Canada (Canadian Armed Forces) (20 December 2001), T.D. 17/01(C.H.R.T.).
117. Ibid. at para. 23.
118. Citron and CHRC et al. v. Zündel(18 January 2002), T.D. 1/02(C.H.R.T.)[hereinafter Zündel].
119. Supra note 1 at s. 13(1).
120. For more detail see the Tribunal's summary of the documents and pamphlets placed before it in evidence, supra.note 118 at para. 120.
121. Ibid. at para. 44.
122. Supra note 118 at para. 66.
123. Ibid. at para. 77. The Tribunal quoted from the Supreme Court decision in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, at 919[hereinafter cited as Taylor].
124. Supra note 118 at para. 81.
125. Ibid. at para. 85-86.
126. Much of the Tribunal's approach to interpreting subsection 13(1) is drawn from the Supreme Court decision in Taylor, which predates the technological advances underpinning Internet transmissions. In applying the reasoning found in Taylor to the Zündel case, the Tribunal said: " We appreciate that the Supreme Court of Canada in Taylor focussed their analysis on the use of a telephone answering machine to deliver pre-recorded messages. There is nothing in that decision, however, that in our view restricts the application of subsection 13(1) to such devices. As we have already determined, the guiding principles outlined in the majority judgment in Taylor provide support for the conclusion that we have now reached regarding the issues of statutory interpretation raised in this complaint." Ibid. at para. 98.
127. Ibid. at para. 80, citing Taylor at 928.
128. Ibid. at para. 140.
129. Ibid. at para. 140.
130. Ibid. at para. 154.
131. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892.
132. Ibid. at 935-936. Reproduced at para. 187 of the Tribunal's decision, supra note 118.
133. In this regard, the Tribunal concluded: " There are, in our opinion, real differences between the facts in Taylor and the facts now before us. Moreover, there are potentially significant differences in the impact on freedom of expression based on these facts that require a fresh analysis and application of the principles discussed in Taylor. The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the telephone as a medium of communication, whereas here we are dealing with a relatively new, growing and pervasive medium of communication, the Internet. The benefits to be secured by application of subsection 13(1) must continue to outweigh the seriousness of the infringement that the subsection imposes on freedom of expression when applied to the facts of this case. Supra note 118 at para. 229.
134. Ibid. at para. 233-235.
135. Ibid. at para. 238 and 240.
136. Ibid. at para. 256.
137. Ibid. at para. 298-299.
138. Murphy and CHRC v. Halifax Employers' Association and Halifax Longshoremen's Association (Local 269)(27 February 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.).
139. Ibid. at para. 12.
140. In this regard the Tribunal remarked: "The Canadian Human Rights Act specifically contemplates that there may be situations where the Canadian Human Rights Commission may want to proceed with a complaint in the absence of an individual complainant. If the Commission is of the view that Ms. Murphy's complaint raised issues of concern to the Commission, it is entirely open to the Commission to initiate complaints against the respondents pursuant to subsection 40(3) of the Act." Ibid. at para. 20.
141.Sawyer et CCDP c. Société Radio Canada(24 August 2001), Décision no.2 (C.H.R.T.).[hereinafter Sawyer No. 2].
142. Stevenson and CHRC v. Canadian National Railway Company (23 March 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.).
143. Ibid. at para. 25.
144. Ibid. at para. 30.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid. at para. 33.
147. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
148.Public Service Alliance of Canada and CHRC v. Minister of Personnel for the Government of the Northwest Territories (25 July 2001), Ruling No. 9 (C.H.R.T.)[hereinafter GNWT No. 9].
149. Section 7 provides: "Where, in any trial or other proceeding, criminal or civil, it is intended by the prosecution or the defence, or by any party, to examine as witnesses professional or other experts entitled according to the law or practice to give opinion evidence, not more than five of such witnesses may be called on either side without leave of the court or judge or person presiding."
150. Supra note 148 at para. 11.
152. Ibid. at para. 28.
153. Ibid. at para. 32. The Tribunal's detailed review of the case law can be found at paragraphs 29-44. It should be noted that the Tribunal concluded that the leading case relied on to establish that section 7 should be applied to each issue raised, rather than to a party's case as a whole, had been rendered per incuriam. The Tribunal felt therefore that this particular decision could be justifiably disregarded.
154. Public Service Alliance of Canada (and the Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada Post Corporation (23 October 2001), Ruling No. 4 (C.H.R.T.). .
155.McAvinn and CHRC v. Strait Crossing Bridge Limited (3 January 2001), Ruling No. 3 (C.H.R.T.)[hereinafter McAvinn No. 3].
156. Ibid. at para. 9.
157. Ibid. at para. 20.
158.Vaid and CHRC v. House of Commons and Honourable Gilbert Parent (25 April 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.)[hereinafter Vaid no. 1]. The Tribunal ruling was appealed to the Federal Court, whose decision is discussed above under the heading Judicial Review of Tribunal Decisions.
159. Ibid. at para. 9. See Soth v. Ontario (Speaker of the Legislative Assembly)(1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 440 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
160. Supra note 158 at para. 28.
161. Ibid. at para. 15 of dissenting opinion.
162.Quigley and CHRC v. Ocean Construction Supplies (17 September 2001), Ruling No. 2 (C.H.R.T.)..
163. Ibid. at para. 4. The Supreme Court decision referred to is: Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929.
164. Bell Canada v. CTEA, CEP and Femmes Action and the CHRC,[2001] 2 F.C. 392(T.D.).
165. Perley v. Tobique Band (22 March 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Premakumar v. Canadian Airlines International (12 April 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Parent c. Lignes aériennes Royal (12 April 2001), Décision No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Wilkinson v. B.C. Telephone Company (21 March 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Jackson v. Staff Sergeant Robert Taubman (17 January 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Rampersadsingh v. Dwight Wignall (24 January 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Caza c. Télé-Métropole (11 April 2001), Décision No. 1 (C.H.R.T.).
166. In Perley v.Tobique Band, Ibid. at para. 7.
167. In Premakumar v. Canadian Airlines International, supra note 165 at para. 11,, the Tribunal said: "I do not accept the submission that it is unlikely that the term of a member hearing this case will expire before the hearing is completed, and thus the issue of extending the members' terms is not likely to arise. The problem that Tremblay-Lamer J. identified with the statute relates not to the way that the Chairperson's discretion may be exercised in a particular case, but rather to the existence of the discretion itself."
168. Ibid. at para. 23-24.
169. See Perley v. Tobique Band, supra note 165 at para. 15. On the procedural facts of this case, the Tribunal concluded that the right to object had not been waived.
170. Stevenson v. Canadian National Railway Company (23 March 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Corbeil v. Pro North Transportation and Brian Glass (15 February 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.).
171. Reference should be made as well to one Tribunal decision that authorized the partial continuation of a hearing (despite the Bell decision) in order that an expert witness could complete his testimony. The reconvening of the hearing for this purpose only was considered necessary in order to avoid considerable future delays in completing that testimony. See Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada Post Corporation (18 April 2001), Ruling no. 3 (C.H.R.T.).
172. Laurentian Bank of Canada v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (27 June 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Larente v. C.B.C. (5 July 2001), Ruling No. 1 (C.H.R.T.), Sawyer c. Société Radio-Canada (3 July 2001), Décision No. 1 (C.H.R.T.).
173. The Ermineskin Cree Nation v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal) (7 September 2001), 2001 ABQB 760 , No. 9903 18454 (Alta.QB)[hereinafter Ermineskin].
174. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), (1982), c. 11[hereinafter the Constitution Act, 1982]. The provision in question (s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982) provides that: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."
175. Supra note 2.
176. Supra note 173 at para. 20.
177. It quoted the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band [1995], 1 S.C.R. 3 at 25-6: "It is now settled that while the decisions of administrative tribunals lack the force of res judicata, nevertheless tribunals may embark upon an examination of the boundaries of their jurisdiction. Of course, they must be correct in any determination they make, and courts will generally afford such determinations little deference." Referred to in Ermineskin, supra note 173 at para. 44.
178. Ibid. at para. 51.
179. Ibid. at para. 52.
180. Ibid. at para. 64.
181. Bradley-Sharpe v. Royal Bank of Canada (18 October 2001), No. T-806-01 (F.C.T.D.)[hereinafter Bradley-Sharpe].
182. Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106.
183.Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Pathak, [1995] 2 F.C. 455 (C.A.).[hereinafter Pathak].
184. The Federal Court in the instant case reproduced the following finding of the Court in: "Only the report of the investigator and the representations of the parties are necessary matter for the Commission's decision. Anything else is in the discretion of the Commission. If the Commission, therefore, elects not to call for some document, that document cannot be said to be before it in its decision-making phase, as opposed to its investigative phase. It is therefore not subject to production as a document relied upon by the Commission in its decision, although it may well have been relied upon by the investigator in his report." Supra note 181 at para. 13.
185. Supra note 181 at para. 17.
186. Ibid. at para. 22. The decision quoted from is Beno v. Létourneau [1997] F.C.J. No. 535 (F.C.T.D.).
187. See Legal Report 2000, infra note 226 at p. 33-34.
188. Bell Canada v. CTEA, CEP, Femmes Action and Canadian Human Rights Commission (2 May 2001), No. A-472-00 (F.C.A.).
189. Ibid. at para. 5.
190. Bell Canada v. CTEA, CEP, Femmes Action and Canadian Human Rights Commission (2 May 2001), No. A-491-00 (F.C.A.) at para. 4.
191. Montreuil c. La Banque National du Canada (21 August 2001), No. T-788-00 (F.C.T.D.).
192. Civil Code of Quebec, Art. 1260 C.C.Q.
193. Supra note 191 at para. 11.
194. Ramlall v. Attorney General of Canada et al. (22 June 2001), No. T-1696-99 (F.C.T.D.)
195. Grover v. National Research Council of Canada et al. (21 June 2001), No. T-586-98 (F.C.T.D.).
196. Ibid. at para. 57.
197. Ibid. at para. 63, citing Miller v.Canada (1996), 112 F.T.R. 195 at 201.
198. Ibid. at para. 66, citing Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1994] 2 F.C. 574 (T.D.), at 600-601.
199. Ibid. at para. 71.
200. Singh v. Attorney General of Canada (19 March 2001), No. T-2259-99 (F.C.T.D.).
202. Sosnowski v. Minister of Public Works et al. (29 November 2001), No. T-1168-00 (F.C.T.D.).
203. Ibid. at para. 4.
204. Ibid. at para. 10.
205. Ibid. at para. 11.
206. Ibid. at para. 14.
207. Moran v. Her Majesty the Queen as represented by Industry Canada (24 May 2001), No. T-1360-99 (F.C.T.D.).
208. Ibid. at para. 8.
209. Ibid. at para. 22.
210.Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Paul (2 April 2001), No. A-132-99 (F.C.A.).
211. In its letter to Commission staff CBC had written: "The offer of settlement made to Ms. Paul and mentioned in this conciliation report was made on a strictly confidential basis, on the express understanding that it was without prejudice to the CBC's position that Ms. Paul's complaint was without merit. It is also contrary to the explicit prohibition on disclosure of such matters contained in section 47 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. Such disclosure goes against the basic purposes of conciliation, which is to provide parties (sic) to discuss on an informal and without prejudice basis, possible terms of settlement of a complaint." Parts of this letter are reproduced in the Federal Court of Appeal decision, Ibid. at para. 13.
212. The Court of Appeal identified the following issues: "(1) Was the Respondent's application out of time? (2) Does the disclosure of the Conciliation Report to the Commission, without the consent of the CBC, vitiate the Commission's decision to refer the complaint to the Tribunal? (3) Did the Commission consider all of the relevant information properly available to it in making its decision to request the appointment of a Tribunal? (4) Did the Motions Judge err in deciding not to refer the matter back to the Commission for reconsideration?" Ibid. at para. 18.
213. Ibid. at para. 19.
214. Ibid. at para. 48.
215. However, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the Commission is not obliged in all cases to make reference to every document it has considered: "I do not wish to suggest that the Commission must always, in a decision made under section 44, make reference to all of the information that it has considered. However, in the circumstances of this case, the explicit reference to the Commission's consideration of particular pieces of information, combined with the failure to refer to other materials which it was under a duty to consider, gives rise to the inference that it did not consider those other materials." Ibid. at para. 51.
216. [2000] 2 S.C.R 307, 2000 SCC 44.
217. Gee v. Minister of National Revenue (2001), 39 C.H.R.R. D/454 (F.C.T.D.).
218. With respect to one of the complaints, the Commission also dismissed on the basis that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission in that it was not based on a proscribed ground of discrimination.
219. Supra note 217 at para. 35.
220. Ibid. at para. 36.
221. Hedges-Mckinnon and Mckinnon v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (31 August 2001), No. T-1299-00 (F.C.T.D.).
222. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1.
223. Hedges-Mckinnon and Mckinnon v. Her Majesty the Queen (8 November 1999), No. 98-1987-IT-I, 98-1989-IT-I (T.C.C.).
224. Rabah v. Attorney General of Canada (11 November 2001), No. T-1228-99 (F.C.T.D).
225. Ibid. at para. 10. This reasoning is found in and adopted from the Federal Court decision in Robinson v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission)(re Royal Canadian Mint) (1995), 90 F.T.R. 43(T.D.) at 49.
226. [2001] 2 F.C. 392(T.D.)[hereinafter Bell 2000].See also Canadian Human Rights Commission, Legal Report 2000 (Minister of Public Works and Government services, 2001) p. 29-31.[hereinafter cited as Legal Report 2000]. Please note: In Legal Report 2000, the decision of the Trial Division was erroneously cited as emanating from the Federal Court of Appeal.
227. Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Bell, [2001] 3 F.C. 481 , 2001 FCA 161 (C.A.)[hereinafter cited as the Bell decision].
228. Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Assn. [1998] 3 F.C. 244 (T.D.).
229. Ibid. at para. 154.
230. An Act to amend the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code in respect to persons with disabilities, to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act in respect of persons with disabilities and other matters and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 1998, c. 9.
231. Ibid. at s. 20(2).
232. Subsection 11(1) of the Act declares: AIt is a discriminatory practice for an employer to establish or maintain differences in wages between male and female employees employed in the same establishment who are performing work of equal value.
233. Supra note 227 at para. 36. The Court of Appeal quoted from Canada (A.G.) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, [2000] 1 F.C. 146 (T.D.).
234. R.S.C. 1985, c. S-22.
235. Supra note 2.
236. Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
237. Supra note 227 at para. 39.
238. Ibid. at para. 41.
239. This is found in subsection 48.2 (2) of the CHRA: AA member whose appointment expires may, with the approval of the Chairperson, conclude any inquiry that the member has begun, and a person performing duties under this subsection is deemed to be a part-time member for the purposes of sections 48.3, 48.6, 50 and 52 to 58."
240. Supra note 227, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 406, File no. 28743 (S.C.C.A.).
241. Northwest Territories v. Public Services Alliance of Canada, [2001] 3 F.C. 566 (C.A.).
242. Ibid. at para. 14.
243. Ibid. at para. 15.
244. Supra note 236.
245. The Court of Appeal referred to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Duke v. The Queen [1972] S.C.R. 917, at p. 923: "Under ss. 2(e) of the Bill of Rights no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to deprive [a person] of a "fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". Without attempting to formulate any final definition of those words, I would take them to mean, generally, that the tribunal which adjudicates upon his rights must act fairly, in good faith without bias and in a judicial temper, and must give to him the opportunity adequately to state his case."
246. The Court ruled: "In view of the important suppletive role of the Canadian Bill of Rights and the significance for any litigant of a fair hearing in the determination of his rights as well as his obligations, I see no compelling reason why the word "person" in Paragraph 2(e) would not include Her Majesty the Queen or the Crown. I see no reason why they, and the citizens that they represent, would not be entitled to a fair hearing when they are a litigant in an administrative or a civil proceeding. It would make a mockery of justice if, as a matter of principle, they were not, especially when made a defendant in a proceeding, entitled to the fair hearing protections given by paragraph 2(e)." Supra note 227 at para. 55.
247. Supra note 241, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 405, No. 28737 (S.C.C.A.).
248. Government of the Northwest Territories v. Public Service Alliance of Canada and CHRC (10 January 2001), No. A-13-00 (F.C.A.).
249. Ibid. at para. 18.
250. House of Commons and the Honourable Gilbert Parent v. Vaid and the CHRC (4 December 2001), No. T-732-01 (F.C.T.D.).[hereinafter House of Commons].
252. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319. The test is reproduced at paragraph 34 of the Federal Court decision: T"he test of necessity is not applied as a standard for judging the content of a claimed privilege, but for the purpose of determining the necessary sphere of exclusive or absolute "parliamentary" or "legislative" jurisdiction. If a matter falls within this necessary sphere of matters without which the dignity and efficiency of the House cannot be upheld, courts will not inquire into questions concerning such privilege. All such questions will instead fall to the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body."
253. Supra note 250 at para. 55.
254. Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 33.
255. Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2.
256. Harvey v. New Brunswick (A.-G.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876. In dealing with the expulsion of a member of a legislature (for reasons of corruption) by the legislative body in question, the Supreme Court declared: "Expulsion and disqualification from office may, if found to fall within the scope of parliamentary privilege, be beyond the purview of section 3 [of the Charter]. But section 3 still operates to prevent citizens from being disqualified from holding office on grounds which fall outside the rules by which parliament and the legislature conduct their business; race and gender would be examples of grounds falling into this category." Section 3 of the Charter recognizes that all Canadian citizen are qualified to be members of the House of Commons or a legislative assembly.
257. Ibid. at para. 81.
258. Ibid. at para. 80.
259. Supra note 230, s. 27. This provision is now subsection 48.1(2) of the CHRA.
260. Zündel v. Citron et al. (25 June 2001), No. A-25-00 (F.C.A.).[hereinafter Zündel FCA].
261. Ibid. at para. 14.
262. International Longshore and Warehouse Union (Marine Section), Local 400 v. Oster et al.(15 October 2001), No. T-1672-00 (F.C.T.D.). For a review of the factual background to this complaint see Legal Report 2000, supra note 226 at p. 15. As a preliminary question, the Federal Court considered the standard of review that should be applied to various findings of the Tribunal. It reconfirmed well-known case law that imposes a standard of correctness with respect to questions of law on the one hand, and a standard of patent unreasonableness to findings of fact, on the other. In so doing, it rejected arguments to the effect that amendments to the CHRA in 1998 and more recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have substantially modified the approach that should be taken to issues of judicial review of Tribunal decisions. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 has endorsed a pragmatic and functional approach to determining an appropriate standard of review. Factors to be considered in this functional approach are: (i) explicit statutory indicators, (ii) an administrative tribunal's relative expertise regarding the matter before it, (iii) statutory purpose, and (iv) the "nature" of the problem, i.e. whether a question of law, fact or mixed law and fact is involved. In light of these factors, the Court concluded that the standards of review on the issues before it were "correctness in respect of questions of law, reasonableness simpliciter in respect of questions of mixed law and fact, and patent unreasonableness in respect of '...fact-finding and adjudication in a human rights context'" See paragraph 22 of its decision
263. Shakes v. Rex Pak Ltd. (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/1001.(Ont. Bd. Inq.). The Court also refers to Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) v. Chander et al. (1997) 131 F.T.R. 301. A prima facie case is made out if: (i) the complainant was qualified for the particular employment, (ii) the complainant was not hired, (iii) someone no better qualified but lacking the distinguishing feature which is the gravamen of the human rights complaint subsequently obtained the position.
264. Supra note 262 at para. 46.
265. Subsection 11(1) of the CHRA provides: "It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to establish or maintain differences in wages between male and female employees employed in the same establishment who are performing work of equal value."
266. S.O.R./86-1082, s. 27(2).
267. Canadian Human Rights Commission and CUPE (Airline Division) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd. and Air Canada (27 July 2001), No. T-62-99, T-63-99 (F.C.T.D.)[hereinafter Airlines].
268. In the words of the Court: "To construe notwithstanding as including the additional meaning of 'to the contrary' would require that the word notwithstanding was being used to resolve an inconsistency or conflict between the relevant provisions. But in the provisions referred to by the applicants, no such inconsistencies or conflicts exist. Therefore, the use of 'notwithstanding' in these instances signals only an exception to an earlier provision. Subsection 11(1) states it is a discriminatory practice to maintain different wages for male and female employees performing work of equal value. Subsection 11(4) simply creates an exception where certain facts exist, namely, if the difference in wages is based on a factor prescribed by the E.W.G., 1986...According, I reject the applicants' submission that the phrase 'notwithstanding any collective agreement' should be read to mean 'notwithstanding any collective agreement to the contrary.'" Ibid. at para. 62-63.
269. Ibid. at para. 68.
270. Ibid. at para. 84.
271. Ibid. at para. 86.
272. Ibid. at para. 88.
273. Ibid.
274. Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General)( 18 December 2001), No. T-590-00(F.C.T.D.).
275. Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces (1968 Revision as amended), Volume 1,(Administrative), issued under the authority of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5.
276. Martin v. Canadian Armed Forces (1992), 17 C.H.R.R. D/435(C.H.R.T.).
277. Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces (1994 Revision), Volume 1,(Administrative), issued under the authority of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5.
278. Supra note 274 at para. 44.
279. For discussion, see Ibid. at para. 48 to 61.
280. Ibid. at para. 53.
281. Ibid. at para. 60.
282. It said: "In my view, the relevant question is not whether the insurance exception developed in tort law can be applied to assess compensation in proceedings under the CHRA, but rather whether the pension payments received by Mr. Carter should be considered in the calculation of his loss of earnings. In my view, the pension payments do not fall within the insurance exception and, as a result, they should be taken into account in the calculation of the loss of earnings." Ibid. at para. 59.
283. Bauman v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (2001), 2001 NSCA 51, 197 D.L.R. (4th) 644 (N.S.C.A.).[hereinafter Bauman].
284. Workers' Compensation Act, S.N.S.1994-95, c. 10, as am. by 1999, c. 1; 2000, c. 4, s. 93.
285. Supra note 283 at para. 30.
286. Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358[hereinafter Benner]
287. Quoted by the Court of Appeal, supra note 283 at para. 35 of its decision, from Benner Ibid.
288. Ibid. at para. 36.
289. The Court of Appeal also rejected a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court regarding similar reinstatement of pension provisions as being wrongly decided: Grigg v. British Columbia (1996) 138 D.L.R. 4th 548. Its view of the Grigg decision is found at paragraphs 91-103 of its own decision, Ibid.
290. Supra note 283 at para. 61.
291. Supra note 30.
292. In the Matter of the Employment Insurance Act and of the claim of Kelly Lesiuk (on appeal from a Board of Referees)(22 March 2001), CUB 51142 [hereinafter Lesiuk].
293. The minimum number of hours for regular benefits is actually defined as a range from 420 to 700, depending on the regional rate of unemployment. In this particular case the claimant was subject to a minimum of 700 hours.
294. Supra note 292 at para. 25.
295. Ibid. at para. 29.
296. Ibid. at para. 50.
297. Ibid. at para. 59.
298. Ibid. at para. 66.
299. Trinity Western University v. College of Teachers (British Columbia) (17 May 2001), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 , 2001 SCC 31[hereinafter TWU]. All nine judges of the Supreme Court heard this appeal. The decision issued was unanimous save for one dissenting opinion.
300. Teaching Profession Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 449.
301. See Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers (1997), 41 B.C.L.R. (3d) 158 (B.C.S.C.). See also Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers (1998), 59 B.C.L.R. (3d) 241 , 169 D.L.R. (4th) 234 (B.C.C.A.)
302. Supra note 299 at para. 25.
303. Ibid. at para. 28.
304. Ibid. at para. 33.
305. Ibid. at para. 35.
306. Ibid. at para. 35.
307. Ibid.
308. Ibid. at para. 36.
309. Ibid. at para. 38.
310. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.[hereinafter McKinney]
311. Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.
312. Greater Vancouver Regional District Employees' Union v. Greater Vancouver Regional District (5 October 2001), [2001] BCCA 435, No. CA027457(B.C.C.A.).[hereinafter GVRD].
313. Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210.
314. Supra note 312 at para. 42.
315. Supra note 312.
316. Ibid. at para. 58.
317. Ibid. at para. 71.
318. Ibid. at para. 120 and 122.
319. Ibid. at para. 125.
320. Ibid. at para. 16.
321. R. v. Latimer (18 January 2001), 2001 SCC 1, No. 26980 (S.C.C.).
322. Although various other criminal law issues were reviewed by the Supreme Court, such as the defence of necessity, only the question of cruel and unusual punishment under the Charter is addressed in this summary.
323. Supra note 321 at para. 73, citing Miller and Cockriell v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680 at page 688.
324. Supra note 321 at para. 74.
325. Ibid. at para. 75.
327. The Court expressed it this way: " On the one hand, we must give due consideration to Mr. Latimer's initial attempts to conceal his actions, his lack of remorse, his position of trust, the significant degree of planning and premeditation, and Tracy"s extreme vulnerability. On the other hand, we are mindful of Mr. Latimer"s good character and standing in the community, his tortured anxiety about Tracy"s well-being, and his laudable perseverance as a caring and involved parent. Considered together we cannot find that the personal characteristics and particular circumstances of this case displace the serious gravity of this offence." Ibid. at para. 85.
328. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
329. Supra note 321 at para. 86.
330. Ibid. at para. 89.
331. Canadian Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10.
332. IN THE MATTER OF the jurisdictional question, arising in the context of an application received by the Canadian Transportation Agency from Linda McKay-Panos against Air Canada, of whether obesity is a disability for the purposes of Part V of the Canada Transportation Act (12 December 2001), Decision No. 646-AT-A-2001.
333. Supra note 331, s. 171.
334. Supra note 332.
335. The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc A/810(1948) 71 [hereinafter cited as UDHR], the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, (Supp.No. 16) 49, Doc. A/6316 U.N. (1966) [hereinafter cited as ICESCR], and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368(Entered into force 23 March 1976),[hereinafter cited as ICCPR] and its two Optional Protocols.
336. Principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights , GA Res. 48/134 (4 March 1994)[hereinafter "Paris Principles"].
337. Ibid. at annex 3(b).
338. Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime(Money laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001.(assented to 18 December 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 41).
339. Bill C-11, An Act respecting immigration to Canada and the granting of refugee protection to those persons who are displaced, persecuted or in danger, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001.(assented to 1 November 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 27).
340. Canadian Human Rights Review Panel, Promoting Equality a new vision, 2000.(Ottawa : Canadian Human Rights Review Panel, 2000).
341. Canada, Parliament, Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, "Promises to keep: Implementing Canada's Human Rights Obligations", 2nd Report, 1st Sess., 37th Parliament, December 2001.
342. Baker c. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 217.
343. Ibid. at para. 70.
344. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N.Doc. A/44/49(1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
345. Suresh v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration et al.(11 January 2002), [2002] 2 SCC 1, File No. 27790.
346. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 9 March 1984, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, 23 I.L.M. 1027.
347. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
348. Supra note 345 at para. 46.
349. Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, Communication 211/98, Decision of the fCmHPR, 29th Ordinary Session, April/May 2001.
350. Supra note 341.
351. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women(1981) 1249 U.N.T.S. 13[hereinafter cited as CEDAW].
352. Ibid.
353.Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 335.
354. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 335.
355. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 335.
356. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force July 7, 1954.
357. For example, see Recommendation (No. 111) Recommendation concerning discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,June 25, 1958., Recommendation (No. 90) Recommendation concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, June 29, 1951., Convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, May 23, 1953, Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, June 25, 1958.
358. Protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. res. 55/25, annex II, 55 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. 1)(2001).
359. Supra note 351.
360. Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44.
361. Supra note 230.
362. Gender related dimensions of racial discrimination : 20/03/2000. CERD General recom. 25. (General Comments), para. 2.
363. Ibid. at para. 4.
364. Equality of rights between men and women (article 3) : . 29/03/2000. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, CCPR General comment 28. (General Comments), para. 5.[referred to as ICCPR].
365. Ibid.
366. Ibid. at para. 30.
367. United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 24 October 1945.
368. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/24(Part I) at 20(1993) at para. 63.
369. Persons with disabilities : 09/12/94. CESCR General comment 5. (General Comments) at para 9.
370. Ibid. at para 11.
371. Price v. The United Kingdom(10 July 2001), REF00002640, Eur. Ct. H.R.
372. "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
373. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 8 U.S.C.S 1409 (U.S.S.C).
374. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101.
375. Supra note 118.
377. Ibid. at para. 90-91.
378. Ibid. at para. 95.
379. Ibid. at para. 104. It should be noted that the issue of equating Zionism and racism as well as of "just and adequate reparation or satisfaction" for "historical injustices",such as colonialism and slavery, were controversial and led to the Governments of USA and Israel representatives to leave the Conference in protest.
380. Communication No. 11/1998 : Slovakia. 09/08/2001. CERD/C/59/D/11/1998. (Jurisprudence), (Decision dated 9 August 2001)
381. Ibid. at para. 2.1-3.1.
382. International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force 4 January 1969.
383. Ibid. at para. 21.
384. Cyprus v. Turkey (10 May 2001), Application no. 25781/94, REF00002519, Eur. Ct. H.R.
385. Ibid. at para. 309.
386. Ibid. at para 311.
387. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994).
388. Approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th Regular Session.
389. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.110 Doc 22, March 1, 2001.
390. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108 Doc. 62, 20 October 2000.
391. Indigenous Peoples : 18/08/97. CERD General recom. 23 . (General Comments), para. 3.
392. For example, three complaints were presented against Canada before the UN Human Rights Committee: Lovelace v. Canada, Communication 24/1977, CLPR/C/27/D/24/1977, 1981; Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Tribe v. Canada, Communication 167/1984, CLPR/C/38/D/167/1984, 1990; Mikmac Tribale Society v. Canada, Communication 205/1986, CLPR/C/43/D/205/1986, 1991. Other countries have also been the objects of complaints from indigenous groups before the Human Rights Committee For example Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication no. 197/1985: Sweden. 10/08/88. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985.
393. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (31 August 2001), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. at para. 149.
394. See Press Release 23/01 of the court (text of decision not available at time of drafting).
395. Gosselin v. Attorney General for Quebec, SCC no. 27418, appeal heard 29 October 2001.
396. ICESCR, supra note 335.
397. The role of national human rights institutions in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights : . 03/12/98. E/C.12/1998/25, CESCR General comment 10. (General Comments), para. 3.
398. CCT38/00 (21 September 2000).[hereinafter cited as Grootbroom].
399. CCT55/00 (29 May 2001).
400. See for example para. 41, Ibid.
